Part II: Identity Thesis

Implications for the Zombie Argument

Introduction

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Implications for the Zombie Argument

The philosophical zombie is supposed to be conceivable: a system physically/functionally identical to a conscious being but lacking experience. If conceivable, experience isn’t necessitated by physical structure.

Under the identity thesis, philosophical zombies are not coherently conceivable. A system with the relevant cause-effect structure is an experience; there is no further fact about whether it “really” has phenomenal properties.

Proof.

By the identity thesis, $\phenom \equiv \cestructure^{\text{intrinsic}}$ . To conceive a zombie is to conceive a system with $\cestructure^{\text{intrinsic}}$ but without $\phenom$ . But since these are identical, this is like conceiving of water without H $_2$ O—not genuinely conceivable once the identity is understood.

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